Russia's annexation of Crimea and its efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine
forced the United States and its European allies to reassess their approach to
European security. This study examines the region that was previously seen
as stable and secure. Likewise, the vulnerabilities of NATO and the member
states of the European Union with regard to Russian economic and military
pressures and with regard to Russian influence in their domestic politics.
Subsequent reports will address Russian capabilities and intentions, as well
as recommendations More possible European measures, and the study
includes dozens of pages of analyzes and documents that the Center of
International Relations for Peace and Security will provide you with in the form
of seminars. Here are summaries of these reports:
Military weaknesses
The annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine have
given rise to a great feeling of insecurity and vulnerability among Russia's
neighbors. This feeling of vulnerability appears to be acute in the proximity of
these countries to Russia, which are the Baltic states in particular (Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania) due to the great imbalance in the military forces
between Russia and the Baltic countries. The Russian behavior increased the
fears of the Baltic states. Violations of borders, airspace, and territorial waters
increased dramatically. Russia also conducted a series of large-scale
exercises in the region, as it conducted a lightning maneuver in the Western
Military Region, which included up to 38,000 soldiers, This study analyzes four
different types of military actions that Russia may undertake and their
implications for the security of the Baltic states:
(1) A short-term, large-scale military action to seize all parts of the Baltic
states or large parts of them.
(2) To conduct tactics identical to those in eastern Ukraine with the aim of
inciting rebellions
(3) Attempt to seize a small part of the lands where the majority of the
population speaks Russian
(4) Carry out limited and temporary incursions into the airspace or Baltic
territory by Russian military personnel. All of these works are within Russian
capabilities. Despite the lack of clarity of Moscows intentions, Russias
behavior in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has made it imperative that NATO
prepare for the possibility of Moscow taking military measures that might
threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic states. In the
presence of potential resistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) without the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it is
worth remembering that Europe and the United States are still vulnerable to a
Russian nuclear attack, as is Russia, which may be vulnerable to an
American, French, and British nuclear attack. All of these countries rely on the
threat of retaliation to deter any such attacks. In the run-up to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Wales, the Polish and Baltic
members discussed the issue of annexation of the Crimean peninsula and
efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine had radically altered the current security
environment in addition to making adjustments to the core force status of
NATO. (NATO). They strive for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
to permanently deploy combat forces on the territory of its eastern member
states. However, it proved impossible to reach a consensus at the summit on
placing combat forces permanently on the eastern lands to reject countries,
especially Germany. Therefore, NATO relied on "presence" (rather than a
permanent presence), provided by rotating forces. Especially from Poland and
the Baltic states, in order to deploy, however, there was increasing pressure,
and a permanent presence on the part of the United States and / or NATO in
their territories. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, the
leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed on a
"supported (subsequent) forward presence," which includes plans to deploy
on a continuous rotation basis for the four multinational battalions, with one
battalion stationed in each of the Baltic states. The three, Poland, and the “ad
hoc (ex) forward presence in demand” in southeastern Europe. Although this
decision represents the growth of (the subsequent), there is likely to be a gap
between the desired NATO presence that was provided in the eastern flank of
the alliance. Whether or not the alliance reaches a consensus will depend
heavily on Russias policies and actions. In the event that the coalition
considers that Russia is violating the second Minsk Agreement, which Russia,
Ukraine, Germany and France signed on February 1, 2015, or if Moscow
takes other measures, such as supporting the separatists attempts to extend
their control over territories that exceed those they already control, then it is
lost. Pressure is increasing on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
to reconsider the issue of permanently stationing combat forces on the
territories of the eastern members of the alliance and to take other measures,
such as the pre-positioning of more supplies and equipment on the territories
of the eastern members of the alliance. Actions from this do not require the
coalition, although efforts will be made to maintain a formal consensus of the
kind as broad as possible. European governments do not seem to be overly
concerned about the current semi-strategic nuclear / dual-use systems
between NATO and Russia. This may change if the potential conflict with
Russia becomes in the Baltic states, or more, and may lead European
governments to insist on directly compensating for the American development
and deploying such systems, as they did in the 1980s. Weaknesses of
investment and trade European vulnerabilities to barriers in non-energy trade
or in the Unions total imports of financial flows are very limited. A small share
of European non-energy energy security comes from Russia. European needs
can be easily covered by other suppliers, with the exception of a few
commodities such as titanium. Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, Poland and
Norway, their economies were affected the most as a result of the Russian
counter-sanctions on fishery and agricultural products and livestock
commodities, compared to other European countries, but these countries also
showed strong resolve against Russian pressure. The advanced European
economies also suffered in export-based growth in many, first and foremost
among them Germany, the slowdown in non-agricultural industries, such as
manufacturing, cars, chemicals, and machinery, due to the decrease in
Russian purchasing power and access to credit. This has had a limited impact
on the overall economy of Germany thus far. Pressure is mounting among
many European allies to lift EU sanctions. The consensus has been reached
so far. And the European Union voted to uphold the sanctions. Barring some
significant concessions from Moscow, the sanctions are likely to remain the
Energy-related weaknesses
Europe is less vulnerable to Russia than is perceived in terms of energy
flows, although Russia is the largest supplier of imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products, to a large extent, to the European Union, but its ability to
threaten member states of the European Union to cut off their supply . And
because crude oil is traded in the global market, if Russia is to divert oil to
other markets, then global crude oil supplies will only be reorganized, because
the crude oil that Russia pumps into non-European markets may find its way
to Europe. Some central European refineries depend on receiving Russian
crude through the Druzhba line, but Russia will have a difficult time
transferring these supplies to other export markets due to restrictions imposed
on its capacity in its oil export ports. As for natural gas, a group of Increased
imports of LNG, increased use of alternative fuels, including coal, renewable
energy sources and fuel oil, electricity demand management and a reduction
in industrial use of natural gas, offset the total cut-off of natural gas imports for
the European Union as a whole. However, natural gas is a card The pressure
that Russia can impose on many of the smaller economies in northeast and
central Europe that are highly dependent on Russian imports. The future
development of gas stations, and cooperative measures from the European
Union, at the same time, may mitigate the effects of a possible Russian supply
of gas to these It is important to note that the use of energy imports as a
pressure card against European countries could be a costly tactic for Russia,
whose economy is largely based on economic growth. Revenue generated
from natural gas sales. Russia might theoretically try to cut its connection to
the electric power grid of the Baltic Republic, which also connects to Belarus
and Kaliningrad. But it will have to first invest in integrating electricity
distribution on its territory to networks located in different regions of Russia.
Ultimately, Russia will likely leverage offers to access its large reserves to
induce European energy companies to pressure their governments. Political
weaknesses The last source of vulnerabilities is related to European domestic
politics. It is possible that Russia might try to support instability in some
countries, notably Estonia and Latvia, which have large disaffected Russian-
speaking minorities. Further south, Greece and Cyprus are facing severe
economic difficulties, and Hungarys leadership has shown some sympathy for
Vladimir Putin. However, none of these countries is likely to risk challenging
the European Union or NATO on an issue of such fundamental political
importance as sanctions against Russia. These countries may complicate the
decision-making process for NATO and the European Union, but it is unlikely
that they will be able to impose a review of sanctions in the near future.
Another important concern is the emergence of far-right parties, such as the
Front National in France. Small differences may be widened. European
countries differ on how to respond to the threat, especially the Baltic countries
and Poland, for a strong response, so that the Russian. Some have argued,
including the deployment and permanent presence of combat forces on the
territories of the eastern members of the coalition. Especially Italy, Spain,
Greece and Slovakia, to lift the sanctions, while other countries want pressure
imposed on Russia and prefer to return to keeping things as they are. It will be
Germanys turn, and many members of the European Union and NATO will
carefully follow my fate to see what position Berlin will take. On how to
respond to Russia's increasingly provocative and assertive behavior, with
other security and economic concerns to bear in mind. Nowadays, these
differences seem easy to deal with. But if these differences intensify, they
could constitute a major obstacle to European integration and the transatlantic
states.
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