European weaknesses due to Russian pressure

Russia's annexation of Crimea and its efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine

forced the United States and its European allies to reassess their approach to

European security. This study examines the region that was previously seen

as stable and secure. Likewise, the vulnerabilities of NATO and the member

states of the European Union with regard to Russian economic and military

pressures and with regard to Russian influence in their domestic politics.

Subsequent reports will address Russian capabilities and intentions, as well

as recommendations More possible European measures, and the study

includes dozens of pages of analyzes and documents that the Center of

International Relations for Peace and Security will provide you with in the form

of seminars. Here are summaries of these reports:

Military weaknesses

The annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine have

given rise to a great feeling of insecurity and vulnerability among Russia's

neighbors. This feeling of vulnerability appears to be acute in the proximity of

these countries to Russia, which are the Baltic states in particular (Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania) due to the great imbalance in the military forces

between Russia and the Baltic countries. The Russian behavior increased the

fears of the Baltic states. Violations of borders, airspace, and territorial waters

increased dramatically. Russia also conducted a series of large-scale

exercises in the region, as it conducted a lightning maneuver in the Western

Military Region, which included up to 38,000 soldiers, This study analyzes four

different types of military actions that Russia may undertake and their

implications for the security of the Baltic states:

(1) A short-term, large-scale military action to seize all parts of the Baltic

states or large parts of them.

(2) To conduct tactics identical to those in eastern Ukraine with the aim of

inciting rebellions

(3) Attempt to seize a small part of the lands where the majority of the

population speaks Russian


(4) Carry out limited and temporary incursions into the airspace or Baltic

territory by Russian military personnel. All of these works are within Russian

capabilities. Despite the lack of clarity of Moscows intentions, Russias

behavior in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has made it imperative that NATO

prepare for the possibility of Moscow taking military measures that might

threaten the sovereignty and independence of the Baltic states. In the

presence of potential resistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) without the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, it is

worth remembering that Europe and the United States are still vulnerable to a

Russian nuclear attack, as is Russia, which may be vulnerable to an

American, French, and British nuclear attack. All of these countries rely on the

threat of retaliation to deter any such attacks. In the run-up to the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Wales, the Polish and Baltic

members discussed the issue of annexation of the Crimean peninsula and

efforts to destabilize eastern Ukraine had radically altered the current security

environment in addition to making adjustments to the core force status of

NATO. (NATO). They strive for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

to permanently deploy combat forces on the territory of its eastern member

states. However, it proved impossible to reach a consensus at the summit on

placing combat forces permanently on the eastern lands to reject countries,

especially Germany. Therefore, NATO relied on "presence" (rather than a

permanent presence), provided by rotating forces. Especially from Poland and

the Baltic states, in order to deploy, however, there was increasing pressure,

and a permanent presence on the part of the United States and / or NATO in

their territories. At the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, the

leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreed on a

"supported (subsequent) forward presence," which includes plans to deploy

on a continuous rotation basis for the four multinational battalions, with one

battalion stationed in each of the Baltic states. The three, Poland, and the “ad

hoc (ex) forward presence in demand” in southeastern Europe. Although this

decision represents the growth of (the subsequent), there is likely to be a gap

between the desired NATO presence that was provided in the eastern flank of

the alliance. Whether or not the alliance reaches a consensus will depend

heavily on Russias policies and actions. In the event that the coalition

considers that Russia is violating the second Minsk Agreement, which Russia,

Ukraine, Germany and France signed on February 1, 2015, or if Moscow

takes other measures, such as supporting the separatists attempts to extend

their control over territories that exceed those they already control, then it is

lost. Pressure is increasing on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

to reconsider the issue of permanently stationing combat forces on the

territories of the eastern members of the alliance and to take other measures,

such as the pre-positioning of more supplies and equipment on the territories

of the eastern members of the alliance. Actions from this do not require the

coalition, although efforts will be made to maintain a formal consensus of the

kind as broad as possible. European governments do not seem to be overly

concerned about the current semi-strategic nuclear / dual-use systems

between NATO and Russia. This may change if the potential conflict with

Russia becomes in the Baltic states, or more, and may lead European

governments to insist on directly compensating for the American development

and deploying such systems, as they did in the 1980s. Weaknesses of

investment and trade European vulnerabilities to barriers in non-energy trade

or in the Unions total imports of financial flows are very limited. A small share

of European non-energy energy security comes from Russia. European needs

can be easily covered by other suppliers, with the exception of a few

commodities such as titanium. Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, Poland and

Norway, their economies were affected the most as a result of the Russian

counter-sanctions on fishery and agricultural products and livestock

commodities, compared to other European countries, but these countries also

showed strong resolve against Russian pressure. The advanced European

economies also suffered in export-based growth in many, first and foremost

among them Germany, the slowdown in non-agricultural industries, such as

manufacturing, cars, chemicals, and machinery, due to the decrease in

Russian purchasing power and access to credit. This has had a limited impact

on the overall economy of Germany thus far. Pressure is mounting among

many European allies to lift EU sanctions. The consensus has been reached

so far. And the European Union voted to uphold the sanctions. Barring some

significant concessions from Moscow, the sanctions are likely to remain the

same for the foreseeable future


Energy-related weaknesses

Europe is less vulnerable to Russia than is perceived in terms of energy

flows, although Russia is the largest supplier of imported crude oil and refined

petroleum products, to a large extent, to the European Union, but its ability to

threaten member states of the European Union to cut off their supply . And

because crude oil is traded in the global market, if Russia is to divert oil to

other markets, then global crude oil supplies will only be reorganized, because

the crude oil that Russia pumps into non-European markets may find its way

to Europe. Some central European refineries depend on receiving Russian

crude through the Druzhba line, but Russia will have a difficult time

transferring these supplies to other export markets due to restrictions imposed

on its capacity in its oil export ports. As for natural gas, a group of Increased

imports of LNG, increased use of alternative fuels, including coal, renewable

energy sources and fuel oil, electricity demand management and a reduction

in industrial use of natural gas, offset the total cut-off of natural gas imports for

the European Union as a whole. However, natural gas is a card The pressure

that Russia can impose on many of the smaller economies in northeast and

central Europe that are highly dependent on Russian imports. The future

development of gas stations, and cooperative measures from the European

Union, at the same time, may mitigate the effects of a possible Russian supply

of gas to these It is important to note that the use of energy imports as a

pressure card against European countries could be a costly tactic for Russia,

whose economy is largely based on economic growth. Revenue generated

from natural gas sales. Russia might theoretically try to cut its connection to

the electric power grid of the Baltic Republic, which also connects to Belarus

and Kaliningrad. But it will have to first invest in integrating electricity

distribution on its territory to networks located in different regions of Russia.

Ultimately, Russia will likely leverage offers to access its large reserves to

induce European energy companies to pressure their governments. Political

weaknesses The last source of vulnerabilities is related to European domestic

politics. It is possible that Russia might try to support instability in some

countries, notably Estonia and Latvia, which have large disaffected Russian-

speaking minorities. Further south, Greece and Cyprus are facing severe

economic difficulties, and Hungarys leadership has shown some sympathy for

Vladimir Putin. However, none of these countries is likely to risk challenging

the European Union or NATO on an issue of such fundamental political

importance as sanctions against Russia. These countries may complicate the

decision-making process for NATO and the European Union, but it is unlikely

that they will be able to impose a review of sanctions in the near future.

Another important concern is the emergence of far-right parties, such as the

Front National in France. Small differences may be widened. European

countries differ on how to respond to the threat, especially the Baltic countries

and Poland, for a strong response, so that the Russian. Some have argued,

including the deployment and permanent presence of combat forces on the

territories of the eastern members of the coalition. Especially Italy, Spain,

Greece and Slovakia, to lift the sanctions, while other countries want pressure

imposed on Russia and prefer to return to keeping things as they are. It will be

Germanys turn, and many members of the European Union and NATO will

carefully follow my fate to see what position Berlin will take. On how to

respond to Russia's increasingly provocative and assertive behavior, with

other security and economic concerns to bear in mind. Nowadays, these

differences seem easy to deal with. But if these differences intensify, they

could constitute a major obstacle to European integration and the transatlantic

states.



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